

MAR 17 1959

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Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000200940184-7

STATINTL

Text of Senator Fulbright's Foreign-Policy Speech

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, March 16.—Following is the text of a speech in the Senate today on the Berlin situation by Senator J. W. Fulbright:

As Mr. Khrushchev maneuvers the Berlin situation on a giddy course toward the conference table, the doubts and fears of our people are probably growing almost in proportion to his assertions and thoroughly unqualified statements.

Clearly, the Executive Branch must have a free hand in finding an acceptable solution to the Berlin question. Yet it is also clear that all Americans should have a free appreciation of our Government's position and of just what is meant when we say we are "standing firm." They want I should think, and surely deserve to see the inherent character of our policy in a clearer and deeper perspective. And this applies to our friends abroad as well as to the American people.

Among many responsible Europeans there is a suspicion that we are weakening; that we are being lured into a conference in which all important concessions will be made on our side. They observe that even as we profess firmness we are trimming our conventional forces. A prominent French editor has been quoted as saying: "They [meaning some French officials] think you are about to commit treason in a war that has already started."

So it becomes urgent that not only the Russians but the entire world understand our intentions—intentions which I believe are shared by Republicans and Democrats alike. If we fail to make our intentions clear we will have alienated our friends and people everywhere who value freedom and we will, of course, have done our adversary a great service.

To Avoid Miscalculations

My purpose in making this brief statement, therefore, is not only to reassure our friends but to make clear to the leaders of the Soviet Union, and thereby avoid miscalculations on their part, that, despite the free debate characteristic of a democracy, the American people regardless of party stand united on the following propositions:

First, the United States will make no separate, or unilateral, deals with the Soviet Union.

Second, the United States will not be driven or enticed from Berlin or from West

Germany. We intend to stay until such time as we, in concert with the Government of West Germany, France and Britain decide to withdraw. Such withdrawal will come only, as a result of some agreement with the Russians on issues larger than Berlin which we and our allies believe is in our interest.

To leave Berlin prematurely, or before Russia's good, would induce consequences of a psychological nature in both the German and Russian spheres. The German people, coming from a long history of our rule, would be deeply hurt. The Soviet people, on the other hand, would be greatly encouraged. The neutral powers, already watching the struggle of two great systems, would thereby gain a new dimension in their evaluation of our chances.

Third, the United States cannot, in honor accept, even tacitly, any proposition designed to normalize the subjugation of the once-free satellite peoples. Our people owe much of their character to the eighteenth century principles which gave meaning and depth to the term "freedom." We could not accept the permanent subjugation of freedom in the satellites then we could consent to any compromise of freedom in Berlin or West Germany.

No Intent to Use Force

This is not to say that we intend to use force against the Soviets to bring about the "normalization" of these presently subjugated peoples. False hopes of physical intervention by us should not be encouraged.

It does mean that we deny that the Russians have any legal or moral right to dominate these subject peoples. We reject the validity of their position based solely upon superior physical power.

It also means, we believe, that to the public opinion of the world will cause the Russian people to question their control of the captive peoples of Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Rumania and Bulgaria.

We may even hope that as conditions of life improve in the U. S. S. R. that the harsh and brutal attitude of the Russians toward their fellow-men may be humanized.

These basic intentions having been stated, it is necessary to add that I see no peculiar virtue in the status quo. We must not, therefore, be unresponsive to fresh, soundly reasoned ideas. We

welcome all responsible suggestions aimed at dissipating this glow of crisis hanging over Central Europe and the sense of futility that goes with it.

There are negotiable points. Agreement by us and the Russians on some of them might serve both our interests. In Germany, we find both sides, each bristling with nuclear weapons, eyeing one another helpfully across an unrealistic boundary. It seems to me, for example, that if both were to move back an equal distance—however slight the distance—the possibility of war, especially accidental war, would be reduced.

Some Ambiguous Terms

Much of the difficulty of making progress toward relieving tensions in Central Europe derives from the growing use of such terms as easement, relocation of forces and, especially, disengagement. If, as seems to be the case, there is a fundamental ambiguity clinging to words like disengagement—and even negotiation—it should be cleared up. These terms must not be equated with appeasement and retreat, as too often they are.

It should be clearly understood by friend and foe alike that under no circumstances will the United States disengage, or relocate its forces except in return for a bonafide quid pro quo—in short, an agreement that would benefit the Western Allies at least as much as it would benefit the Soviet Union.

We ought not to accept the facile axiom that the Russians have no intention of ever coming to reasonable terms on any matter directly affecting their own interests. To endorse such dogma would be to accept an amelioration of the present situation, surely insupportable over the stretch of time. To the corollary admonition—that any deal with Russia would have to be policed—we agreed. Neither the United States nor any of its allies has prepared to trade an easement of the situation for any agreement that could not be effectively monitored.

Finally, as the time for negotiation drew nearer, it is essential to remind ourselves not to expect too much in the way of results. A willingness on our part to negotiate, even to relocate military forces under the right circumstances, is all to the good. However, to expect any substantial easement in the near future would be the height

of wishful thinking. Indeed, it may be a matter of years rather than months, before the Russians will extend a quid equal in value to our quo.

As before, our duty is to strengthen our defenses and our resolve. Also, we must not be discouraged. Instead, we should chip away relentlessly at the encrusted Communist mixture of dogma, braggadocio and fear that contributes so much to keeping world peace in a recurring state of serious jeopardy.